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In 1985, after 40 years of financial instability, Argentina reached
once again near—hyperinflation conditions. Budget deficits were the immediate
cause, but the deeper roots must be seen in ill—fated policy experiments of
the 1970s. The destructive pendulum between populists and market-oriented
reformists has meant that much of national wealth is held abroad, taxes are
paid by only few and the general atmosphere is one of scepticism about
everything Argentinian. Mallon and Sourrouille (1975) have drawn attention to
this steady conflict when they write
"Decision makers in Argentina have quite consistently attempted
to adopt policy positions that seemed designed to tear society apart
rather than to forge new coalitions.... Major policy disagreements in
modern Argentina history have their main roots in the conflict between
two divergent streams of thought: liberalism of the British Manchester
School variety and what can be called national populism.. .Ingeneral the
liberals have stood for the virtues of a society open to international
opportunities and influences, whereas the national populists have
emphasized indigenous, autonomous development."
1This paper represents an overview of a longer study on Argentine debt
problems prepared as part of the NBER research project on developing
country debt.2
Our study investigates the interaction between domestic macroeconomic
instability and external constraints. We study these relationships by focusing
on the past decade in which four very different periods can be distinguished.
The Martinez de Hoz period of the 1970s (march 76—march 81) when
external debts were accumulated in the context of an incompatible mix of
policies: large, persistent deficits, a strongly overvalued currency and
liberalization of capital flows.
•The period running from the end of the 1970s to the hyperinflation.
In this period debt and foreign exchange problems, war and domestic politics,
are the reasons for an inflation explosion.
The Austral stabilization plan.
eThe post—Austral quest for a resumption of growth.
A. Longrun Perspective
Although we only focus on the past ten years we place our analysis in
a longer run context. This is appropriate since debt problems and financial
crises are at least 100 years old in Argentina. One hundred years ago
Argentina's inability to service foreign the debt nearly brought down the City
of London in the famous Baring panic of 1890; the famous Tornquist monetary
reform dates back to 1899.
It is important to view developments in this long term perspective
because it highlights how Argentina has lost its position in the world economy
steadily during this century.2 Carlos Diaz Alejandro (1970,p.l) reminds us of
this decline:
"It is common nowadays to lump the Argentine economy in the same
category with the economies of other Latin American nations. Some
2See Ford (1983), Williams (1971) and Diaz Alejandro (1970) for
Argentine economic history prior to World War II.3
opinion even puts it among such less developed nations as India and
Nigeria. Yet most economists writing during the first three decades of
this century would have placed Argentina among the most advanced
countries——with Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.
To have called Argentina "underdeveloped" in the sense that word has
today would have been considered laughable."
If in 1900 Argentina had a U.S. standard of living then the decline
has been long and deep. Summers and Heston (1985) estimate that in 1950
Argentina had only 41 percent of the U.S. standard of living (against 80
percent in Australia and Canada). By 1985 the standard of living had slipped
to only 30 percent of the U.S. level. Figure 1 shows the level of per capita
real income in Argentina over the past 45 years.
There is a striking difference between the steady expansion of the
thirty years to 1975 and the stagnation and decline that have occurred since
then. The contrast could not be stronger: From 1945 to 1975 per capita income
grew at an annual rate of 1.7 percent. From 1975 to 1985 it fell at an annual
rate of 1.7 percent.
The other dimension in which Argentinian performance has shown a
dramatic deterioration is inflation and fiscal stability. Of course, there
have been frequent precedents of massive inflation and depreciation. But the
experience of the past decade, with two near—hyperinflations stands out. In
1899 Banker's Magazine already reported of South Americans and their
currency:
•. [they]are always in trouble about their currency. Either it is too
good for home use, or, as frequently happens, it is too bad for foreign






































































































































































































exchange. Generally they have too much of it, but their own idea is that
they never have enough.. the Argentines alter their currency almost as
frequently as they change presidents.. No people in the world take a
keener interest in currency experiments than the Argentines."
The experience with the destruction of the financial system in the
past fifteen years has certainly reinforced that keen interest and expertise.
Figure 2 shows the monthly rate of inflation since 1970. In interpreting the
graph one should bear in mind that a monthly rate of inflation of 6 percent
corresponds to 100 percent per year and 22 percent per month yields an annual
rate of 1000 percent. Inflation passed 1000 percent both in the Peronist
period of 1975—76 and again in the pre—Austral period of early 1985. At no
time in the past ten years did they fall below 100 percent for any length of
time.
The third broad feature that we want to draw attention to concerns the
real exchange rate. This is key price in any economy and even more so in
Argentina. Figure 3 shows the real exchange rate measured as the ratio of
Argentine manufactured prices relative to those of her trading partners.4
The extraordinary variations in Argentina's external competitiveness
tie closely with the macroeconomic policy mistakes, capital flight induced by
these mistakes and the present debt crisis. The outstanding episode, clearly
apparent in Figure 3, is the real appreciation of 1979—1981. For the period
1970—78 the real exchange rate averaged 73; it increased to 108 over the next
three years before declining back to an average of 75 in the 1982—86 period.
4This is the series reported regularly by Morgan Guaranty World
Financial Markets., We are indebted to Rimmer de Vries for making























































































































































































































































































































By March 1987 it had fallen to almost a third of the peak value during the
period of most extreme overvaluation. The swings in the real exchange rate
capture best the seesaw nature of Argentine policies. In some periods
unimaginable damage is done to the productive and financial structure and then
a period of repair follows where austerity and real' depreciation restore the
base for yet another political, fiscal or foreign exchange adventure.
Table 1 shows the debt accumulation over the past 15 years. There is
considerable uncertainty about the size of the external debt prior to the late
1970s and available estimates from various official sources vary widely.
Estimates of the BCRA show that debt varied between $2.5 and 3 billion in the
1960s, starting with about the same level as it ended. But from 1970 on
external debt steadily increases both for the private and for the public
sector. Between 1970 and 1977 the external debt rises by $6 billion and in the
next four years by more than $30 billion.
Table 1Argentina' External Debt
($Billionand Percent)
1975 1978 1979 1982 1985
Total External Debt ($) 7.9 12.5 19.0 43.6 48.3
Public ($) 4.0 8.4 10.0 28.6 40.0
Reserves ($) 0.6 5.8 10.1 3.0 6.0
Net Debt/Exports () 260 110 120 540 520
Debt/GDP (Z) 18.6 23.9 30.2 60.3 64.5
Interest Payments/GDP (%)0.7 1.4 1.4 2.4 5.7
Source: World Bank, BCRA and Morgan Guaranty6
With this broad overview of the past decade we now turn to a review of
the principal episodes. We use these episodes to describe and explain their
relevance to the debt problem, or the role of the external debt in creating
domestic macroeconomic difficulties. A brief chronology of dates and important
facts help place the events in context:
The Martinez de IIoz Period (3/1976—3/1981): When de Hoz assumed power as
finance minister of the military government consumer prices in the previous
month had increased at an annual rate of 5000 percent, output had declined
sharply. The black market premium for foreign exchange exceeded 200 percent.
The new program was to stabilize the macroeconomy, as a first priority, and
then to renovate industry and financial markets. Macroeconomic stabilization
came under way quite rapidly so that inflation fell to less than 200 percent
soon.
A financial reform was implemented that aimed to liberalize capital
markets and link Argentina more effectively with the world capital market.
Already in late 1976 foreign exchange transactions were completely liberalized
on capital account and this was done so effectively that for the next four
years the black market premium was zero. Figure 4 shoes the black market
premium and brings out the striking interlude of free capital mobility between
the Peronist period and the aftermath of the collapse of Martinez de Hoz'
policies.
























































































































































































































































Inflation failed to decline further once it had come to the 150
percent range. To make further inroads policy makers opted for what Fernandez
(1985) has called an "expectations management approach." Beginning in 1979
they pre—fixed the rate of exchange depreciation with a tablita, announcing
ahead of time a gradually declining rates of depreciation. Theseannouncements
were repeated on a rolling (though shortening) basis so as to create an
environment where economic agents could discern a government commitment to
disinflation embodied in the time table for declining rates of exchange
depreciation.
This policy was expected to reduce inflating through three separate
channels. First, reduced rates of depreciation would directly reduce the rate
of import price inflation. Second, reduced depreciation would enforce a
discipline on domestic price setters. Third, in an environment where inflation
to a large extent depended on expectations the rule or precommitinent
introduced as nominal anchor around which expectations could rally. Needless
to say, the intellectual underpinnings of such a program relied on the belief
that the "law of one price" would be strongly operative.
Inflation responded to this policy and gradually fell throughout 1980
to reach ultimately a bottom well below 100 percent. But gradually, during
1978 and 1979, the real exchange rate appreciated because inflation
consistently outpaced the rate of depreciation. We saw in Figure 3 that the
cumulative overvaluation reached 50 or even 60 percent. But while the
overvaluatjon ultimately led to capital flight and collapse of the financial
system, the early stages were quite the opposite. The high interest rates——8
relative to world rates and the preannounced rate of depreciation—— gave rise
to an (almost) riskfree speculation in favor of Argentine assets. As a result
private sector borrowing abroad increased to take advantage of the relatively
low foreign interest rates and a massive capital inflow developed. This is
shown in Table 1 in the large increase in Central Bank reserves between 1978
and 1979 and the matching increase in private external borrowing.
The trade and employment effects of the overvaluation were slow to
come. Diaz Alejandro (1964) has shown that the real income effects of a real
depreciation tend to be dominant in the early stages, before substitution
effects take over. For the real appreciation of 1977—80 the reverse applied:
the increase in real income created an expansion in demand and thus seemed to
validate the Martinez de Hoz approach by creating inflation reduction with
rising real income. This factor was reinforced by the fact that trade
protection, even with liberalization measures, kept the economy relatively
closed which dampened the disinflation effects of the tablita but also the
effects in the real sector.
By 1979—80 the overvaluation had become so extreme that financial
markets increasingly took the view that depreciation would have to come
sometime. Even though the government asserted that the policy would be
continued, and could be financed, speculation increasingly went in the
direction of dollar purchases. The regime of unrestricted capital mobility
introduced in late 1976 facilitated this capital flight to the maximum. Hence,
in 1979—80, the Central Bank and public sector enterprises were forced to
borrow massively abroad to obtain the foreign exchange which is then sold in9
support of the exchange rate policy. Private speculators in turn bought the
dollars and applied them abroad. With the round trip complete, commercial
banks in New York, Zurich and Tokyo had lent to the government the resources
to finance capital flight which returned to the same banks as deposits. Of
course, capital flight was not limited to dollar deposits. Investments in
financial markets were important as was real estate abroad.
A variety of estimates is available on the accumulation of external
assets by Argentines during this period. These estimates are typically formed
as residuals from debt and balance of payments data. They are obtained by
deducting from the recorded increase in gross external debt the current
account and recorded capital flows in the form of direct investment and
changes in reserves. Dornbusch (1985), for example, calculates that capital
flight in 1978—82 amounted to $23.4 billion. In a review of various estimates
the IMP (Watson et al. (l986),p.l42) reports capital flight amounting to
cumulatively to about $15 billion in 1979—1981. Rodriguez (1986) estimates
that between 1979 and 1982 the external assets of Argentinian's increased from
$10 billion to $34 billion. The estimates would have to be revised upward to
the extent that underinvoicing of exports and overinvoiciong of imports was a
significant channel of capital flight in this period.
Both the fact of and the motivation for the wave of capital flight in
the late 1970s are very clear. Unlike in other debtor countries as for
example Brazil or Chile, mismanagement of the exchange rate combined with an
opening of the capital account are the almost exclusive explanation for the
massive debt accumulation. The particular background must be understood to10
appreciate that in Argentina's case the government has an external debt, but
the private sector has matching external assets. Moreover, that process was
carried further over the next few years as the government increasingly took
over all external debt in the course of sustaining failing financial
institutions. In 1980 about half of the debt was owed by the public sector and
in 1985 that share had increased to 82 percent.
From Martinez de Hoz to Alfonsin (3/81—12/83): The end of the military
government did not come easy. The Martinez de Hoz overvaluation had sown the
seeds of financial destruction, but the actual unraveling came only over the
next four years. The world economy contributed to the difficulties by the debt
crisis: sharply declining commodity prices and much higher interest rates
brought with them difficulties in servicing the external debt.
But domestic events certainly were the dominant fact. First came the
undoing of the overvaluation. This started with the change of presidents: the
incoming president, months before taking office, declined to comment on his
exchange rate policy. This served as an obvious indication to anyone that
devaluation was ahead and hence capital flight turned massive. Central Bank
reserves declined by more than $5 billion and public external debt increased
sharply. Finally Martinez de Hoz was forced by his successor, not yet in
office, to bring his own expectations management and credibility approach to
an end by depreciating the currency.
Over the next three years exchange depreciation and inflation became
endemic, rising from less, than 100 percent to 600 percent at the time Alfonsin11
took office. Changes in public finance and financial markets were particularly
important in this period. Exchange control was instituted once again and the
black market premium reemerged (See Figure 4). The Central Bank, in an effort
to assure continuing trade flows started exchange rate guarantee programs only
to find that it could never hold on to the guaranteed exchange rates. As a
result of losing a string of bets in the foreign exchange market the budget
deteriorated dramatically. The deterioration was reinforced by financial
failures that turned up in public sector hands, by the burden of external
interest payments and by deteriorating terms of trade. The conflict in the
South Pacific added to the loss in confidence and devastation of public
finance.
The economics of this period of deterioration can be expressed in
terms of a simple model of deficit finance and of financial markets. Suppose
the budget deficit represents a fraction (g) of national income and let
velocity of highpowered money be an increasing function of the rate of
inflation. Then it can be shown that the rate of inflation (p) will be an
increasing (and steeply rising) function of the deficit, but it will also
depend on financial institutions.
(1) p =(ag—y)/(1—bg)
The higher the level of noninflationary velocity (a) and the more responsive
velocity is to inflation as measured by the parameter (b) the more dramatic
the inflation impact of budget deficits.12
This framework helps to identify the interaction of deficits, external
debt service, real depreciation and financial markets in generating the
inflation explosion of 1981—84. Increasing burdens of debt service, because of
higher interest rates and real depreciation increased the budget deficit ratio
(g) and hence raised money creation and inflation. The institutional response
of financial markets to higher inflation aggravated this impact by a flight
from money. The reduction in money holdings was facilitated by an increasing
range of interest bearing substitutes. As these came increasingly into play
velocity sharply increased (a and b in (1) above increased) and that meant the
inflation rate associated with a given deficit ratio also escalated.
The 1981—84 period thus represents an unraveling of the artificial
stability of the late 1970s. Several events, each in itself extraordinary,
combined to make the crisis large: the initial overvaluation had been extreme,
the financial sector had been allowed to become overexposed in speculation,
private capital flight had been massive and finally the world economy turned
unfavorable just at the wrong time. Each of these factors deteriorated the
budget and hence reinforced inflation.
Alfonsin (1/1984— ):
These difficulties carried over to the beginning of the Alfonsin
administration. Large real wage increases in 1983—84 created problems for the
budget and for the external balance. Inflation rapidly escalated and
negotiations with creditors and the IMF did not bring a solution.13
The inflation issue soon become the single most pressing problem. In
early 1985 annualized monthly rates of inflation rose toward 1500 percent and
beyond. The possibility of a hyperinflation was entirely realistic since the
inflation process itself eroded the real value of tax collection as well as
the financial system, so that ever more money needed to be created to finance
an ever widening deficit. Because IMF programs seemed unable to cope with the
inflation problem on a timetable and in a fashion that was politically
acceptable, and because the sheer pace of disintegration was so rapid, the
government considered extreme measures. The monetary reform known as the
Austral Plan was just that, an all—out attempt to stop hyperinflation.
The details of the June 1985 Plan of Economic Reform which is now
called the Austral plan were as follows:
A real depreciation and a sharp increase in real public sector
prices. An export and import tax, a forced saving scheme and
accelerated tax collection.
A wage—price—exchange rate freeze.
A new money, the Austral, and a promise not to create money to
finance the budget.
A conversion scale for existing contracts that would adjust them
so as to keep real burdens unchanged in the face of the
unanticipated reduction in inflation.
• An IMF agreement and a rescheduling agreement with the creditors.
The stabilization immediately reduced inflation to levels of only 1-2
percent per month. The decline in inflation and the fiscal measures brought
about a rapid and major shift in the budget. High real interest rates and the
budget improvement created an atmosphere of at least temporary stabilization.14
The black market premium vanished. For a country that had been on the verge of
hyperinflation the stabilization created an immense relief, but it also left
considerable scepticism as to the possibility of stopping inflation by edict.
The scepticism extended in particular to the governments ability to achieve
sufficient budget control to permanently reduce the need for inflationary
money creation.
But even if scepticism subsisted the stabilization proved an important
political move and as such a stepping stone for ultimate and more deeply
rooted stabilization. A public opinion survey presents an assessment over time
of the public response to policy and management. The data are reported in
Table 2.
Table 2 Response To The Austral Plan
(Percent of the sample responding positively)
1984 1985 1986
Dec. May Aug. Dec. Apr.
Austral Plan 74 68 52
Economic Management 19 10 40 35 19
Government in general 46 35 57 52 36
President Alfonsin 72 64 74 71 64
Source: La Nacion
This was not the first time Argentina had used wage—price controls to
stop inflation. Indeed, in 1975—76 this was tried and the experience ended in
an outburst of repressed inflation. The Austral plan has in fact not brought
price stability. Inflation today is back to the 100—200 percent range. But the15
important achievement is that inflation was brought down from more than 2000
percent and that this was accomplished without a major decline in economic
activity, rise in unemployment or reduction in the purchasing power of wages..
Today there is little risk that in the near term the stabilization
will collapse. That confidence makes it possible and fruitful for the
government to concentrate on the two key issues: how to achieve further budget
improvement so as to bring inflation down to less than 20 percent and how to
restore investment and growth. External debt and debt service has a bearing on
each of these questions.
Investment. Debt and the Budget:
The budget influences inflation as well as investment and growth
because it influences the distribution of resources in the economy. If the
government commands a large share of the resources less is left for the
private sector. the government may use these resources to service the external
debt via noninterest external surpluses, it can use the resources to support
consumption or it can make them available for investment. The possible choices
of budget strategy then are to service the debt, sustain consumption or use
resources for growth. Table 3 shows the budget of the consolidated government.
Table 3The Budget
(Percent of GDP, Budget Basis)
Expenditure Revenues Budget Deficit
1980 43.9 36.4 7.5
1981 49.1 35.8 13.3
1982 48.2 33.1 15.1
1983 51.6 34.8 16.8
1984 46.2 33.4 12.8
1985 47.4 41.5 5.9
1986 43.4 39.8 3.6
Source: BCRA16
Two points must be separated in looking at the budget impact on the
economy. One is the y in which the government financesits outlays, i.e. by
regular taxes, by borrowing or by the inflation tax. The second, possibly
related, is how the tax system determines the allocation of resources among
sectors. To illustrate, the government can replace the inflation tax with
outright taxes and there will be little effect in the aggregate except that
inflation will decline. But if the inflation tax declines without an
offsetting increase in outright taxes than an offsetting reduction in
absorption needs to occur: either the government cuts its spending orit
reduces its debt service.
For the country at large there is a tradeoff between consumption,
investment and net resource transfers abroad. These points can be brought out
by looking at the GDP identity:
(2)Output =NetResource + Investment+Consumption
Transfer Abroad
where consumption denotes private and public sector consumption and
investment, likewise, includes the private and public sector. With a given
amount of resources or output available (because the economy is fully employed
already) the budget and the external debt strategy now determine inflationand
growth.4
17
To show the range of options we can look at two particular scenarios.
One possibility is to keep budget adjustments to a minimum, not to interfere
with consumption and yet foster growth via increased investment. That strategy
requires, as (2) shows, that resource transfers abroad can no longer occur or
must even be reversed. In a second scenario the government seeks both
investment and continued, partial debt service. In that case the resource
shortage calls for crowding out of consumption by outright taxation or by the
inflation tax.
Over the past few years crowding out of investment, not consumption
has been the rule. By maintaining relatively tight money and a strongly
competitive exchange rate the government has crowded out private investment,
leaving resources with consumption and transfers abroad absorbing the
available resources. The adverse effect of positive and often high real
interest rates on investment is all the more punishing in that uncertainty
about future budget trends and debt service, and hence interest rates, make it
unwise to repatriate capital or risk borrowing.
Figure 5 shows the extraordinarily low rate of private investment (as
a percent of GNP) in Argentina. Net investment in fact is zero or negative.
With productive capacity not expanding, or even shrinking, there is no source
of growth in the standard of living. Hence the question is whether the current
policy mix can be sustained much longer without doing irreparable damage to
the economy productive system and thus to the longrun viability of the
economy. The flourishing of the underground economy is certainly a warning



























































































































































































IMP programs for Argentina, in the absence of an official change in
the debt strategy, anticipate that the current account deficit gradually
declines as a ratio of GDP and ultimately turns toward surplus. The 1986
program, for example, anticipated that by 1990 Argentina's current account
would reach a modest surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP. That means, ofcourse,
net resource transfers in the full amount of interest labilities and no "new
money" except for principal. This strategy, if it is to be consistent with
even moderate growth of the economy's supply side, requires a major shift in
the budget to contain consumption. That can take the form of a much higher
inflation tax or a much higher outright form of taxation.
Latin American leaders advocate a different scenario. They argue that
net resource flows need to be reversed and that the noninterest surpluses can
come down. Resources need to be transferred inward again, they argue, so that
they can supplement scarce domestic saving in financing domestic investment.
Such a reversal of resource flows encounters the problem of creditworthiness.
If now debtor countries like Argentina experience difficulties in servicing
the debt, is it plausible that yet more debt should be added. Feldstein (1986,
1987) has argued that some countries, in particular Brazil, can both borrow
and grow without risking the build up of an unsustainable debt. It is
difficult to see that possibility in Argentina, except in the context of a
major restructuring of the public sector.
But if increased reliance is placed on external resources by reducing
net transfers abroad the question must be asked how the extra room thus gained
should be used. Once again a fiscal reform could translate these resources19
into growth of productive capacity. Using them for consumption would simply
reduce creditworthiness and thus presage yet another financial crisis sometime
in the future.
Argentina thus faces a critical juncture in respect to fiscal policy.
Fiscal choices today are critical because they affect inflation and growth and
because there is little room left for mistakes. The external debt service is a
key variable because it presently absorbs resources that could be available
for growth. But resource savings due to reduced external debt service
(assuming there is no debt forgiveness) can only be used productively if
fiscal reform translates them into sharply higher growth. The critical
decisions to make that possible have as yet not been reached. Moreover, if
capital markets are unwilling to lend on a major scale then most of the growth
must be financed by reduced consumption. Thus the policy mistakes of the 1970s
directly translate into a growth crisis for the 1980s.
The present effort to stabilize the budget and hence bring about
growth and financial stability goes in its implications much beyond the
economic sphere. Political and institutional instability in Argentina resemble
that of the Weimar Republic and Central Europe in the 1920s or the 5th
Republic in France. The political instability in turn influences economics
because it stands in the way of continuity and farsightedness of economic
policies. If, as has been the case in Argentina, the average tenure of a
central bank president is less than a year this is certainly not conducive to
a long view. The attempt at reconstruction underway today is thus of
extraordinary significance. This also implies that increased flexibility of20
external constraints associated with debt service assumes particular
importance.
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80 0.7 87.6 8.6 —6.1 100.0 100.0
81 —6.2 131.3 18.0 —2.7 69.5 113.8
82 —4.6 209.7 18.9 3.3 48.9 98.5
83 2.8 433.7 17.8 3.9 58.8 94.1
84 2.6 688.0 13.8 4.2 58.4 101.7
85 —4.5 385.0 5.1 6.2 48.9 88.4
86 5.7 81.9 — 1.9 45.2 78.4Table A—2
EXTERNAL SECTOR
(US dollars
Current accountInterest Non—mt Terms of Debt/GOPReal exc.
$ % of qdp payments curr.ac trade rate
70-159,0 —0.8-222.5 63.6 106.6 16.7 56.7
71—389.0 —1.8—255.9—132.8 116.4 18.2 49.7
72-223.0 —1.0—273.0 50.0 125.7 21.8 52.9
73 721.0 2.7—317.0 1038.0 134.6 20.0 58.6
74 127.0 0.4—298.0 425.0 117.8 20.4 71.2
75 —1284.0 —3.5—460.0—824.0 111.5 18.6 36.9
76 665.0 1.7—465.0 1130.0 95.8 18.6 46.4
771290.0 3.0—370.0 1660.0 92.7 19.2 50.7
78 1833.0 4.0-405.02238.0 83.5 23.9 64.7
79—537.0 —1.0—493.0 —44.0 88.4 30.2 83.4
80—4767.0 —7.6—947.0 —3824.0 100.0 37.3 100.0
81 —4714.0 —7.4—2965.0 —1749.0 113.8 48.1 69.5
82—2357.0 —3.8 —4403.02046.0 98.5 60.3 48.9
83—2461.0 —3.8 —4983.02522.0 94.1 59.5 58.8
84—2391.0 —3.5 -5273.02888.0 101.7 60.5 58.4
85 —953.0 —1.5 —4879.03926.0 88.4 64.3 48.9
86 —2645.0 —4.0 —3934.0 1289.0 78.4 — 45.2
Table A—3
Prices (1980100)
Agric/ Real Public Real Terms of Real Exc. Relative





71 132.14 100.13 263.25 116.4 49.69 216.39
72152.38 97.64 216.16 125.7 52.92 308.20
73141.67 107.61 267.77 134.6 58.62 249.18
74123.81 151.71 264.36 117.8 71.15 337.70
75 97.62 158.53 217.64 11.5 36.92 319.67
76104.76 131.63 124.01 95.8 46.46 478.69
77111.90 130.05 83.01 92.7 50.69 393.44
78109.52 133.60 79.59 83.5 64.69 124.59
79110.71 104.59 70.73 88.4 83.38 93.44
80100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.00 100.00
81 90.48 115.88 106.46 113.8 69.54 63.93
82103.57 111.29 139.89 98.5 48.92 103.28
8 107 14 131 50 15 54 941 5877 150 0'
84101.19 147.24 142.94 101.7 58.38 145.90
85 85.71 159.97 110.34 88.4 48.92 —
86109.52 147.77 110.06 78.4 45.15Table A—4
Budget Interest on Interest on Operational
Deficit foreign debt domestic debt Deficit
61 3.79 0.02 0.06 3.71
62 6.80 0.04 0.05 6.71
63 6.59 0.02 0.07 6.50
64 5.60 0.03 0.09 5.48
65 2.87 0.03 0.05 2.79
66 3.65 0.03 0.05 3.57
67 1.83 0.03 0.03 1.77
68 1.72 0.03 0.04 1.65
69 1.28 0.03 0.03 1.22
70 2.03 0.15 0.26 1.62
71 4.58 0.21 0.27 4.10
72 6.10 0.31 0.25 5.54
73 8.60 0.18 0.36 8.06
74 8.52 0.18 0.61 7.73
75 15.59 0.16 0.53 14.90
76 10.56 0.15 1.33 9.08
77 5.04 0.14 1.00 3.90
78 6.67 0.17 1.76 4.74
79 6.65 0.10 1.93 4.62
80 8.56 0.30 1.55 6.71
81 17.97 3.47 2.75 11.75
82 18.78 4.36 3.87 10.55
83 17.76 2.44 0.54 14.78
84 13.79 2.81 0.34 10.64
85 5.10 2.60 0.13 2.37
86 4.70Table A—S
in{lation budget Base/SDP M1/6DP M2JGDP M3/GDP M4/6DP
deL/gdp
70 21.7 2.03 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.25
71 39.1 4.58 0.10 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.23
72 64.1 6.10 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.21
73 43.8 8.60 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.22
74 40.2 8.52 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.27 0.28
75 335.1 15.59 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.17
76347.5 10.56 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.16
77 160.4 5.04 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.16
78 169.8 6.67 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.20
79 139.7 6.65 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.21
80 87.6 8.56 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.23
81 131.3 17.97 0.09 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.22
82 209.7 18.78 0.29 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.19
83 433.7 17.76 0.29 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.14
84 688.0 13.79 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.12
85 385.0 5.10 0.12 0.40 0.11 0.11 0.13
86 81.9 4.70 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.18